Abstract. We suggest some simple variants of the CBC MAC that enable the efficient authentication of arbitrary-length messages. Our constructions use three keys, K 1, K 2, K 3, to avoid unnecessary padding and MAC any message M ∈ {0, 1} * using max{1, |M|/n } applications of the underlying n-bit block cipher. Our favorite construction, XCBC, works like this: if |M| is a positive multiple of n then XOR the n-bit key K 2 with the last block of M and compute the CBC MAC keyed with K 1; otherwise, extend M's length to the next multiple of n by appending minimal 10 padding ( ≥ 0), XOR the n-bit key K 3 with the last block of the padded message, and compute the CBC MAC keyed with K 1. We prove the security of this and other constructions, giving concrete bounds on an adversary's inability to forge in terms of his inability to distinguish the block cipher from a random permutation. Our analysis exploits new ideas which simplify proofs compared with prior work.
Introduction
This paper describes some simple variants of CBC MAC. Unlike the basic CBC MAC, our algorithms correctly and efficiently handle messages of any bit length. In addition to our schemes, we introduce new techniques to prove them secure. Our proofs are much simpler than prior work. We begin with some background.
The CBC MAC. The CBC MAC [7] , [9] is the simplest and most well-known way to make a message authentication code (MAC) out of a block cipher. Let us recall how it works. Let = {0, 1} and let E : K × n → n be a block cipher. The key space for the CBC MAC is the key space K for E and the message space for the CBC MAC is the set ( n ) + of all binary strings whose length is a positive multiple of n. So let M = M 1 · · · M m be a string that we want to MAC, where |M 1 | = · · · = |M m | = n, and let K ∈ K be the key we want to use to MAC this string. Then CBC E K (M), the CBC MAC of M under key K , is the value C m where C i = E K (M i ⊕ C i−1 ) for i = 1, . . . , m and C 0 = 0 n . Bellare et al. proved the security of the CBC MAC in the sense of reduction-based cryptography [1] . Their proof depends on the assumption that it is only messages of one fixed length, mn bits, that are being MACed. Indeed, when message lengths can vary the CBC MAC is not secure. This fact is well known. As a simple example, notice that given the CBC MAC of a one-block message X , say T = CBC E K (X ), the adversary immediately knows the CBC MAC for the two-block message X (X ⊕ T ) since this is once again T .
Thus the CBC MAC (in the "raw" form that we have described) has two problems: it cannot be used to MAC messages outside of ( n ) + and all messages must have the same fixed length.
Dealing with Variable Message Lengths: EMAC.
To properly handle message lengths that vary, the CBC MAC can be embellished. There have been several suggestions for doing this. The most elegant one we have seen is to encipher CBC E K 1 (M) using a new key, K 2. That is, the domain is still ( n ) + but one defines EMAC (for Encrypted MAC) by
). This algorithm was developed for the RACE project [2] . It was analyzed by Petrank and Rackoff [14] who show, roughly said, that an adversary who obtains the MACs for messages that total σ blocks cannot forge with probability better than 2σ 2 /2 n . Among the nice features of EMAC is that one need not know |M| prior to processing the message M; the method is said to be on-line. All of our suggestions retain this feature.
Our Contributions. EMAC has a domain limited to (
n ) + and uses 1 +|M|/n applications of the block cipher E. In this paper we refine EMAC in three ways: (1) we extend the domain to * ; (2) we shave off one application of E; and (3) we avoid keying E by multiple keys. Of course we insist on retaining provable security (across all messages lengths).
We introduce three refinements to EMAC, which we call ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC. These algorithms are natural extensions of the CBC MAC. We like to think that this is an asset. The point here is to strive for economy, in terms of both simplicity and efficiency. Here M is the message to MAC and E : k × n → n is a block cipher. The third column gives the number of applications of E, assuming |M| > 0. The fourth column is the number of keys used to key E. For CBC the domain is actually ( n ) + but the scheme is secure only on messages of some fixed length nm. Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of the CBC MAC variants mentioned in this paper. The top three rows give known constructions (two of which we have now defined). The next three rows are our new constructions. Note that our last construction, XCBC, retains essentially all the efficiency characteristics of the CBC MAC, but extends the domain of correct operation to all of * . The cost to save one invocation of the block cipher and extend our domain to * is a slightly longer key. For each of the new schemes we provide a proof of security. Our proof approach begins by viewing ECBC as an instance of the Carter-Wegman paradigm [5] , [16] : with ECBC one is enciphering the output of an almost-universal hash-function family, this almost-universal hash-function family being the CBC MAC itself. Thus by bounding the collision probability of the CBC MAC (Lemma 3), we get a modular proof for ECBC. We then use the security of ECBC to prove security for FCBC, and then we use the security of FCBC to prove security for XCBC. For this last step we employ a general lemma (Lemma 6) that says, in effect, that you can always replace a pair of random independent permutations π 1 (·), π 2 (·) by a pair of functions π(·), π(· ⊕ K ), where π is a random permutation and K is a random constant.
We expect that several alternative approaches would also yield proofs for ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC, with similar bounds to ours. One could adapt the rather complex proof of Petrank and Rackoff [14] , or the even more complicated one of Bellare et al. [1] . Better would be to apply the general framework of Maurer [13] , which has already been used to analyze the basic CBC MAC. Another approach is to use the decorrelation theory of Vaudenay [15] , which has already been used to analyze EMAC, the encrypted CBC MAC. Our proof relies on less machinery than these alternatives.
Subsequent Work. Iwata and Kurosawa present a variant of XCBC that makes do with a single block-cipher key [10] . Their OMAC algorithm is identical to XCBC except that one
, say, with the indicated multiplication being carried out in the finite field GF(2 n ).
Standards. This work was motivated by the emergence of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and the anticipated interest in updating old modes of operation that we hoped AES would engender. Our belief is that a modern MAC standard needs to specify clearly an algorithm that can correctly MAC any sequence of bit strings. The methods here are simple, efficient, provably sound, and patent-free-good characteristics for a modern cryptographic standard. We have been told that NIST intends to release a recommendation specifying the OMAC variant of XCBC [6] . The algorithm will be renamed CMAC.
Publication
History. An earlier version of this paper appeared in CRYPTO '00 [4] .
Schemes ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC
Arbitrary-Length Messages Without Obligatory Padding: ECBC. We have defined CBC E K 1 (M), which is not secure across strings of varying lengths, and
, which is. However, the domain of EMAC remains limited to ( n ) + . What if we want to MAC a message whose length is not a multiple of n?
The simplest approach is to use obligatory 10 padding: always append a "1" bit and then the minimum number of "0" bits to make the length of the padded message a multiple of n, and then apply EMAC. We call this method EMAC * . Formally,
This construction works fine. In fact, it is easy to see that this form of padding always works to extend the domain of a MAC from ( n ) + to * . One unfortunate feature of EMAC * is this: if |M| is already a positive multiple of n then we are appending an entire extra block of padding, seemingly "wasting" an application of E. People have worked hard to optimize new block ciphers, and it seems a shame to squander some of this efficiency with an unnecessary block-cipher call. Furthermore, there are settings where one needs to MAC short messages that are always or often a multiple of the block size. In such a case saving one block-cipher call can be a significant performance gain.
Our first new scheme lets us avoid padding when |M| is a nonzero multiple of n. We simply make two cases: one for when |M| is a positive multiple of n and one for when it isn't. In the first case we compute EMAC E K 1 E K 2 (M). In the second case we append minimal 10 padding ( ≥ 0) to make a padded message P whose length is divisible by n, and then we compute EMAC E K 1 E K 3 (P). Notice the different second key-K 3 instead of K 2-in the case where we have added padding. Here, in full, is the algorithm. It is also shown in Figure 2 . The ECBC construction using a block cipher E : K× n → n . Three keys are used,
On the left is the case where |M| is a positive multiple of n, while on the right is the case where it is not.
In Section 4 we prove that ECBC is secure. We actually show that it is a good pseudorandom function (PRF), not just a good MAC. The security of ECBC does not seem to directly follow from Petrank and Rackoff's result [14] . At issue is the fact that there is a relationship between the key (K 1, K 2) used to MAC messages in ( n ) + and the key (K 1, K 3) used to MAC other messages.
Improving Efficiency: FCBC. Ignoring the case of M being the empty string, with ECBC we are using |M|/n + 1 applications of the underlying block cipher. We now show how to eliminate the +1. We start off, as before, by padding M when it is outside ( n ) + . Next we compute the CBC MAC using key K 1 for all but the final block, and then use either key K 2 or K 3 for the final block. Which key we use depends on whether or not we added padding. The algorithm follows, and is also shown in Figure 3 . In Section 5 we prove the security of this construction. Correctness will follow from the correctness of ECBC.
Avoiding Multiple Encryption Keys: XCBC. Most block ciphers have a key-setup step, when the key is turned into subkeys. Taken together, the subkeys are usually larger than the original key, and computing them may be expensive. So keying the underlying block cipher with multiple keys, as is done in EMAC, ECBC, and FCBC, is not so desirable. It would be better to use the same key for all of the block-cipher invocations. The algorithm XCBC does this. 
On the left is the case where |M| is a positive multiple of n, while on the right is the case where it is not. 
We again make two cases. If M ∈ ( n ) + we invoke CBC as usual, except that we XOR in an n-bit key, K 2, before enciphering the last block. If M ∈ ( n ) + then append minimal 10 padding ( ≥ 0) and invoke CBC as usual, except we XOR in another n-bit key, K 3, before enciphering the last block. The algorithm follows; also see Figure 4 . The proof of security can be found in Section 6.
Comment. Note that the XCBC-variant that XORs the second key just after applying the final enciphering does not work. That is, insisting that |M| is a nonzero multiple of the blocksize, we would have that MAC π,K (M) = CBC π (M) ⊕ K . For an attack, let the adversary ask for the MACs of three messages: the message 0 = 0 n , the message 1 = 1 n , and the message 1 0. As a result of these three queries the adversary gets tag
However, now the adversary knows the correct tag for the (unqueried) message 0 (T 0 ⊕ T 1 ), since this is just
Thanks to Mihir Bellare for pointing out this attack.
Alternative Notation. The subscripts to CBC, ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC have been written as E K (for CBC) and E K 1 E K 2 E K 3 (for ECBC and FCBC) and E K 1 K 2 K 3 (for XCBC). It is important for the remainder of this paper to realize that, used as subscripts above, E K , E K 1 , E K 2 , and E K 3 may be considered as names of functions-we could just as well have written ρ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , and ρ 3 , for example. Even though we had called E a block cipher, it was never necessary for E K , E K 1 , E K 2 , or E K 3 to be permutations-any function from n to n would be fine. So at this point, for any ρ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 : n → n and any K 2, K 3 ∈ n , we have defined the map CBC ρ : ( n ) + → n and maps from * to n of ECBC ρ 1 ρ 2 ρ 3 and FCBC ρ 1 ρ 2 ρ 3 and XCBC ρ 1 K 2 K 3 . We will henceforth be using this less cumbersome notation.
Preliminaries
Basic Notation. All strings are understood to be over the alphabet = {0, 1}. If X is a string then X n = max{ |X |/n , 1} is its length in n-bit blocks. By X $ ← X we denote the experiment of choosing a random element from the set X and assigning it to X . By Pr[Experiment : Event] we denote the probability of the specified event after performing the specified experiment.
Function Families. A function family is a collection of functions
* are sets of strings, along with an associated probability distribution.
We speak of choosing a random element of F by writing f $ ← F. Let Rand(n) be the set of all functions from n to n , let Perm(n) be the set of all permutations on n , and let Rand(M, n) be the set of all functions from M to n , where M is a set of strings. Rand(n), Perm(n), and Rand(M, n) are function families, endowed with the uniform distribution in the natural way.
It is often the case that each function in a function family is named by a key K from a set of possible keys K. The function family is then viewed as a map
It is K that must now have an understood distribution, so that one can speak of choosing a random element K from K. The two views of a function family are equivalent.
A block cipher is a function family E : K × n → n . One normally requires that E K (·) be a permutation for all K ∈ K, but this restriction is never actually needed in this paper.
Collision Probability. Fix n > 0 and let H = {h : M → N } be a function family. The collision probability of H is the function
We define Coll H (m, m ) as 0 if there are no distinct M and M in M where M n = m and M n = m . The collision probability of a function family is a formalization and generalization of the idea of a hash-function family being almost-universal [5] .
Making Function Families from CBC, ECBC, FCBC, XCBC.
We defined CBC, ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC as maps that depend on a function ρ (for CBC), on a triple of functions ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 (for ECBC and FCBC), or on a function ρ 1 and strings K 2, K 3 (for XCBC).
To speak of security, we need to think of CBC, ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC as naming function families. Namely, one specifies the function family from which ρ is drawn (for CBC ρ ), or the function families from which ρ 1 , ρ 2 , and ρ 3 are drawn (for ECBC and FCBC), or the function family from which ρ 1 is drawn (for XCBC, where K 2 and K 3 are assumed to be chosen uniformly at random from n ). We write the needed information in brackets, following the mode name, as in F = ECBC[Rand(n)×Rand(n)×Rand(n)], meaning that a random element f is determined by choosing ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 $ ← Rand(n) and setting f = ECBC ρ 1 ρ 2 ρ 3 .
Adversaries. An adversary A is an algorithm with an oracle. In this paper the oracle will compute some deterministic function. Adversaries are assumed never to ask an oracle query outside of the domain of the oracle and never to repeat a query. We write A⇒1 for the event that A outputs the bit 1.
Security Notions. Let M be a nonempty set, let F = {M → n } be a function family, and let A be an adversary with an oracle f : M → n . We say that the adversary forges if it outputs a pair (M, f (M)) where M ∈ M and the adversary never queried its oracle f at M. We let
We overload the notation above and write Adv xxx F (R) (where x x x ∈ {mac, prf, prp}) for the maximal value of Adv xxx F (A) among adversaries that use resources at most R. Resources of interest are: t, the running time of the adversary; q, the number of queries the adversary makes; and σ (where n ≥ 1), the communications complexity of the adversary, as measured in n-bit blocks. Time is understood to include the description size of the adversary A. Communications complexity is the sum of the block lengths of each oracle query.
Switching PRP/PRF. It is often convenient to replace random permutations with random functions, or vice versa. The following proposition lets us easily do this. For a proof see Proposition 2.5 in [1] .
Lemma 1 (PRF/PRP Switching). Fix n ≥ 1. Let A be an adversary that asks at mostueries. Then
Security of ECBC
We prove the security of ECBC, showing that ECBC[Perm(n) × Perm(n) × Perm(n)] resembles Rand( * , n) provided the adversary asks no more than some specified maximum number of oracle queries. The proof views ECBC as the CBC MAC followed by an enciphering step. The CBC MAC is regarded as an almost-universal hash-function family, and we bound its collision probability. The enciphering step is done by applying one of two functions, ρ 2 or ρ 3 , depending on the padding that was initially performed.
Applying a PRF to the output of an almost-universal hash-function family is a wellknown approach for creating a PRF or MAC [3] , [5] , [16] . The novelty here is our method of dealing with messages that are not a multiple of the block length and, more significantly, the treatment of the CBC MAC as an almost-universal hash-function family. The latter might run against one's instincts because the CBC MAC is a much stronger object than an almost-universal hash-function family. Yet we ignore this extra strength and focus just on the object's collision probability.
Security of the Three-Key Carter-Wegman Construction
We abstract the structure of ECBC, replacing the CBC construction that it uses by an arbitrary hash function h. So, letting h : ( n ) + → n and ρ 2 : n → n and ρ 3 :
if |M| is a positive multiple of n, and
n → n } and F3 = {ρ 3 : n → n } be function families. Then the definition of CW3 h ρ 2 ρ 3 lifts to give a function family
. Using this construction, we have extended H from a function family with common domain ( n ) + to family F with common domain * . We now prove the security of this function family, assuming ρ 2 and ρ 3 are random functions and H is good as an almost-universal hash-function family.
Proof. We provide a game-playing argument, as used in works like [11] . Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle. Assume that the queries asked by A to this oracle total at most σ blocks. Without loss of generality, assume that A never repeats an oracle query. We must compare (1) 
Consider providing an oracle for A in one of two ways, game E1 or game E2, as specified in Figure 5 . In the pseudocode there, and in later proofs, we let Domain(ρ) denote the set of points X ∈ * such that ρ(X ) = undefined. Game E1 provides a perfect sim- 
Oracle f , when asked f (M):
Games used in the analysis of CW3. Game E1 is the mechanism above, as written, while game E2 omits the shaded statements.
(still subject to the constraint that these messages sum to σ blocks). At this point we have eliminated the interaction in game E2. We may also reorder the queries without impacting the probability that bad will get set to true, so relabel 
The result follows.
The Collision Probability of the CBC MAC
is small. By "small" we mean a slowly growing function of m = M n and m = M n . One way at getting such a result is to infer it from the result of Petrank and Rackoff [14] . Here we provide a direct analysis, using a game-playing argument. The lemma improves the (m + m ) 2 /2 n bound we proved in the proceedings version of this paper [4] . 
Consider game C1, as defined in Figure 6 . This game realizes one way to compute Y m = CBC ρ (M) and Y m = CBC ρ (M ) for a random ρ ∈ Rand(n), and so we would like to bound the probability, in game C1, that Y m = Y m . Also depicted in Figure 6 is game C2, obtained by eliminating the shaded statements.
Before taking up the analysis of the games in earnest, we give a bit of intuition about what they aim to capture. We are interested in the probability that Y m = Y m . This can . . , X m ). There is nothing "magical" about giving up exactly on these internal collisions-it is simply that the more internal collisions one gives up on the worse the bound but the easier the analysis. The proof we give formalizes the intuition of this paragraph and does all the necessary accounting. The outline of the proof goes like this: We first argue that game C1 perfectly simulates running CBC MAC on two distinct inputs over a random function. We then argue that a collision in the outputs of these messages implies that the flag bad will be set to true. Then we argue that in game C2, a simplified version of game C1, is identical to game C1 provided that bad has not been set to true. Finally we bound the probability that bad becomes true in game C2 which in turn bounds the probability of a collision. Now look at game C1. It works not by growing a single random function ρ but by growing three random functions: η, ι, and ι . The function η keeps track of the association of points that arise during the processing of N , the function ι keeps track of the association of points that arise during the processing of I , and the function ι keeps track of the association of points that arise during the processing of I . If a value X should get placed in the domain of two or more of these three functions then we regard the corresponding range value as that specified first by η if such a value has been specified, and as the value secondarily by ι otherwise. In game C1 this behavior is enforced by performing the if statements in reverse order: if, for example, X j ∈ Domain(η) on line 46, Y j will be assigned the value η(X j ) even though it may have been assigned different values on lines 41, 44, and 45. Game C1 can thus be seen to provide a perfect simulation of the CBC algorithm over a random function ρ ∈ Rand(n), and we seek to bound the probability,
We first claim that, in game C1, any time that Y m = Y m it is also the case that flag bad gets set to true. . Also note that games C1 and C2 are identical until the flag bad gets set to true (meaning that any execution in which a highlighted statement is executed it is also the case that bad is set to true in that execution) and so, in particular, Pr 1 n . This is done by summing the probabilities that bad gets set to true at lines 14, 24, 42, 45, and 46.
The probability that bad gets set at line 14 of game C2 is at most 0. ) and is independent of the domain of η. Thus each time line 24 executes there is at most a k/2 n chance that bad will get set, and the line is executed m − k times. The probability that bad gets set at line 42 of game C2 is at most (m − k)/2 n . This is because the line is executed m − k times and each time the chance that bad gets set is 1/2 n since Y j was just selected at random from n . The probability that bad gets set at line 45 of game C2 is at most (m − k)(m − k)/2 n . Each point X j whose presence in the domain of ι is being tested is of the form X j = Y j−1 ⊕ M j , as defined at line 43. Each of these Y i−1 values with the exception of Y k was uniformly selected at line 41, independent of the now-determined domain of ι. As for X k+1 = Y k ⊕ M k+1 , the value Y k was just selected uniformly at random back at line 12 and is independent of the domain of ι apart from the domain point Y k ⊕ M k+1 , which is guaranteed to be distinct from Y k ⊕ M k+1 by our criterion for choosing k. Thus each time line 45 executes there is at most a (m − k)/2 n chance that bad will get set, and the line is executed m − k times. The probability that bad gets set at line 46 of game C2 is at most k(m − k)/2 n for reasons exactly analogous to that argument used at line 24.
We conclude by the sum bound that the probability that bad gets set somewhere in game C2 is at most
Since k can be zero, this value is at most (mm +m )/2 n . Recalling that m is the block length of the longer of M and M , the proof is complete.
The Security of ECBC
The lemmas given establish the security of ECBC. The result is as follows.
Theorem 4 (Security of ECBC).
Fix n ≥ 1. Then for any σ ≥ 0,
Proof. Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we have that
where the penultimate statement derives from the fact that (1) 
(Switching CBC[Perm(n)] to CBC[Rand(n)] costs at most 0.5 σ 2 /2 n since a total of σ blocks are queried; switching the two remaining Perm(n) objects to Rand(n) costs at most 0.5 q 2 /2 n . Since q ≤ σ , we bound the sum of these quantities by 1.5 σ 2 /2 n .) Therefore our total bound, using the triangle inequality, is σ 2 /2 n + 1.5 σ 2 /2 n , which completes the proof.
Comments.
We have given an entirely information-theoretic treatment of ECBC. In the standard way one can now pass from the information-theoretic setting to a complexitytheoretic one. This is standard and so we omit doing this. For our final scheme, XCBC, we include a complexity-theoretic bound.
The security of ECBC as a MAC follows immediately from the security of ECBC as a PRF. This too is standard. See [1] for an exposition.
It is easy to exhibit an attack on ECBC that asks σ < C2 n blocks worth of queries and then forges with success probability at least cσ 2 /2 n , where c, C > 0 are absolute constants. In this sense our analysis is tight. The same claim of tightness can be made for the FCBC and XCBC analyses. Thus our security bounds say that if the underlying block cipher is a good PRP, then it is safe to use ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC on a number of blocks σ well under 2 n/2 , while easy attacks make clear that it is unsafe to use ECBC, FCBC, and XCBC on a number of blocks σ near or beyond 2 n/2 . Similar arguments to what we have given can be used to prove the security of the EMAC construction [2] , yielding a proof much simpler than that found in [14] .
Security of FCBC
In this section we prove the security of FCBC, obtaining the same bound we had for ECBC.
Theorem 5 (Security of FCBC).
Proof. Let us compare the distribution on functions
We claim that these are the same distribution, so, information theoretically, the adversary has no way to distinguish a random sample drawn from one distribution from a random sample from the other. The reason is simple. In the ECBC construction we compose the permutation π 1 with the random permutation π 2 . However, the result of such a composition is just a random permutation, σ 2 . Elsewhere in the ECBC construction we compose the permutation π 1 with the random permutation π 3 , but the result of such a composition is just a random permutation, σ 3 . Making these substitutions-σ 2 for π 2 •π 1 , and σ 3 for π 3 • π 1 , we recover the definition of ECBC. Changing back to the old variable names we have
so the bound of the present theorem follows immediately from Theorem 4.
Security of XCBC
We now prove the security of the XCBC construction. We begin with a lemma that bounds an adversary's ability to distinguish between a pair of random permutations (π 1 (·), π 2 (·)) and the pair of permutations (π(·), π(K ⊕ ·)), where π is a random permutation and K is a random n-bit string. This lemma, and ones like it, may make generally useful tools. Indeed, this technique anticipates the generalization of making multiple permutations from one [12] .
Lemma 6 (Two Permutations from One). Fix n ≥ 1. Let A be an adversary with a left oracle and a right oracle, and assume that A asks at most q total queries. Then
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that adversary A is deterministic and never repeats a left-query and never repeats a right-query. We consider answering the adversary's queries by either of two games, X1 or X2, shown in Figure 7 . These games are identical except for game X2 omitting the four shaded statements. As before, Domain(π ) is the set of all X ∈ n for which π(X ) is not undefined. We write Range(π ) for the set of all Y ∈ * such that π(X ) = Y for some X . By Range(π ) we denote n − Range(π ). For both games X1 and X2, first we invoke the initialization procedure. Then when the adversary makes a query X to its left oracle we compute f (X ), and when the adversary makes a query X to its right oracle we compute g(X ).
We claim that game X1 perfectly simulates a pair of oracles where the first is a random permutation π(·) ∈ Perm(n) and the second is π(K ⊕ ·), for a random n-bit string K ; while game X2 perfectly simulates a pair of independent random permutations on n-bits,
Initialization:
Oracle f , when asked f (X ):
Oracle g, when asked g(X ): Pr
To verify (3) note that the externally visible behavior of game X2 does not depend on lines 10, 12, 20, and 22; these only determine the setting of a flag, bad, whose value is never consulted. With those lines expunged the set S tracks the diminishing set of allowed return-values to f -calls and the set T tracks the diminishing set of allowed return-values to g-calls.
(Note that in game X2, π(·) is updated but never consulted; in game X1, where π(·) is used, we require it to be a permutation. In game X2 this is not required and indeed π(·) will typically be noninjective.) Thus game X2 faithfully simulates a pair of random permutations π 1 (·), π 2 (·).
To verify (2) focus on the variable π , which we build up in a manner consistent with
n . Lines 10 and 20 ensure that we answer queries consistent with the current assignment to π . When we need to assign a new value to π, selecting a random value Y in Range(π ), we do this in a somewhat peculiar way, first sampling from a set S and then, if this fails to give a point in Range(π ), sampling again, this time from Range(π ). That this two-step procedure (lines [11] [12] gives a random sample from Range(π ) follows from the invariant that S ⊇ Range(π ). Similarly, T ⊇ Range(π ) and so lines 21-22 choose a random sample from Range(π ) and game X1 faithfully simulates a pair of oracles π(·), π(K ⊕ ·).
Games X1 and X2 sometimes set a variable bad to true during the execution of the game. Notice that the two games behave identically prior to bad becoming true, and so, as per the usual game-playing approach, we know that
Putting this together with (2) 
We proceed by bounding the second of these two addends. When the adversary makes its ith oracle call the set S and the set T have at least 2 n − i + 1 points, while Range(π ) has at most i − 1 points. Thus the chance that we ever choose a random point Y from S or T that happens to lie in Range(π ) is at most 
We are left with bounding Pr[A X2 sets bad in line 10 or 20]. To do this, we simplify game X2 in a number of ways that will not impact the probability that bad gets set at line 10 or 20. (1) Start off by eliminating lines 12 and 22. These lines are not relevant to the event in question. (2) Next, observe that the values assigned to π are never used-all that mattered was whether or not a point was placed in the domain of π . So, letting X correspond to the domain of π , replace the for-statement of line 01 by X ← ∅; replace Domain(π ) by X at line 10; replace the first statement of line 13 by Initialization: Figure 8 , and we aim to bound the probability that an adversary B that asksueries of game X3 manages to set bad. Adversary B never repeats an f -query or a g-query, and 
To bound Pr[B X3 sets bad], realize that queries to this game return nothing to the adversary, and so we may assume that the adversary B is noninteractive. Suppose it asks queries 
Combining the numbered equations completes the proof.
The security of XCBC follows from the security of FCBC (Theorem 5) and the method embodied by Lemma 6. 
to the quantity above. To compute this distance we note that ||A − C| − |B − C|| ≤ |A − B| which allows us to bound (9) by
Now, instead of bounding (10), we bound the distance
since clearly this distance must be larger (an adversary who does well in the setting of (10) can be converted to one which does at least as well in the setting of (11)). Two applications of Lemma 6 give us an upper bound on (11) where q 1 is the number of oracle queries that are positive multiples of n bits and q 2 is the number of oracle queries that are not. As q ≤ σ , the result follows.
We conclude this paper by giving the complexity-theoretic analog of Theorem 7. It follows from the information-theoretic result in the usual way, but, for completeness, we explicitly state the result and provide a proof for it. 
Corollary 8 (Security of XCBC, Complexity-Theoretic Version
Equation (12) 
